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Regulation of New Economy
Markets - The case of Wired
Residential Internet Service
Provision 
David Jacobson and Tom Weymes
Introduction1
The ISP market in Ireland is relatively immature. Although Ireland’s first Service
Provider IEUnet was established in 1991, it is only in the last two or three years that a
choice of provider and access price points has emerged under the regulatory regime of
the Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (OTDR). This has been
achieved through the introduction of a telecommunications licensing regime by the
ODTR, the specifics of which are available from the ODTR website.2 From a position
where there was only one telecommunications operator, the former PTO3 namely
Eircom, there are currently 77 other licensed operators (OLOs) in the State. The
regulation imposes on ISPs that provide the initial connection to the Internet the need to
obtain a licence.  ISPs that provide portal sites and search engines but not the
telecommunication access to the user - like international companies Yahoo and Alta
Vista, or Irish companies like Ireland.com - are not required to obtain a
telecommunications licence. This form of ISP provides services after the initial
connection to the Internet is made. 
The ISPs under investigation here are those that supply the initial physical
connection to the Internet as well as access to the World Wide Web. This level of Internet
connectivity constitutes a telecommunications service and thus an operator requires a
telecommunications licence.4 We further focus on the market specifically for residential
Internet service provision.
Regulatory rationale for telecommunications
Why is regulation of the telecommunications sector necessary and how and why have
these regulations changed in recent years?  According to Geddes (1999) public utilities
in general have ‘network’ structures, for example extensive distribution systems of lines
or pipes. Utilities also have substantial sunk costs associated with these networks.
Moreover, there is, in any particular utility sector - electricity, telecommunications,
water distribution, etc. - need for no more than one network.  As a result utilities have
typically been granted legally enforced monopolies over their service areas.
Recently however utilities have experienced regulatory reform in the shape of
increased competition through more liberal entry.  According to Geddes (1999), new
technologies in the telecommunications sector have made the old regulatory regime
unworkable. ‘Where once regulated or government owned monopolies dominated
because of the belief that most utilities were ‘natural monopolies’, there is now a
growing consensus that competition can perform a broader and more effective role’
(Geddes, 1999: 1162).  This liberalisation typically involves the separation of network
provision from the services sold over the network (OECD, 1996). To study the wired
residential ISP market, therefore, both telecommunications network provision and
Internet service provision must be examined. 
There are many arguments for and against market regulation, an investigation of
which is beyond the scope of this paper.5 What we will do here is to briefly compare the
arguments of Chang (1997), a political economist, with those of Martenson (1998), a
chief executive in the Finnish telecommunications industry.  This will be followed by a
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brief discussion of regulatory reform of telecommunications in New Zealand, Australia,
Chile and Guatemala.
Chang (1997) comments that many professional organisations impose their own
‘self-regulation’. Therefore many markets which may appear to be regulation-free are in
fact heavily regulated, although not necessarily by a governmental agency.   The choice
between self-regulation and imposed governmental regulation is, he says, a matter of
‘relative efficiency’. That is, a governmental approach to regulation may be cheaper
because of scale economies in information processing and enforcement.
Some types of deregulation may actually require increased government intervention.
This can clearly be seen in the recent tendency of many governments, including that in
Ireland, to apply more severe regulations to incumbent firms than to new entrants
(asymmetric regulation) in certain industries such as telecommunications.  This
generally follows a belief that the incumbent firm is in a position of relative market
power which it may unfairly exploit in the absence of additional regulation. For example,
the ODTR has voiced concerns that Eircom, as the previous monopoly incumbent in
telecommunications, is favouring its own subsidiaries such as Indigo in the new
competitive regime, thus justifying regulation.
In terms of technological progress, Chang (1997) maintains that it can lead to the
‘unbundling’ of natural monopolies, ‘which makes deregulation of certain segments of
the industry feasible and desirable - as seen in the recent developments in the electricity
and telecommunications industries’.  Technological advancement may also, according to
Chang (1997), lead to the blurring of industry boundaries, such as has occurred
between the computer and technology industries and which may require existing
regulation to be ‘re-packaged’.  The emergence of entirely new markets due to
technological change may also require timely regulatory intervention. ‘All these suggest
that regulatory regimes should not be taken as given, but be adapted to changing
technological conditions in a dynamic way’ (Chang, 1997: 721). 
Martenson (1998) - against the backdrop of a telecoms market in which wired and
wireless phone penetration is above 100 per cent6 - argues that government regulation
should be minimised. His view is that ‘the longer the rules are in place, the harder it will
be to scrap them’.  This suggests that protecting new firms against the power of the
incumbent will, even if it is desirable in the short term, go on for longer than it should.
It is, in this view, better not to have such regulation in the first place.
With regard to the creation of a truly commercial market for telecommunications,
Martenson (1998) observes that some important parts of the present EU
telecommunications policy actually go against the concept of free enterprise. He
comments that in a truly free market system each supplier would try to create and
develop a market segment, which is different from its competitors.  It is also in the
nature of the market economy that any such challenger tries to become dominant in this
segment while challenging new segments.  It would be illogical, according to Martenson
(1998) to label an incumbent position (such as Eircom in Ireland) wrong, a priori.  Also,
as economies of scale and scope develop, mergers and acquisitions will lead to bigger
and bigger enterprises.  If such developments are unwanted, there are, according to
Martenson, general rules (competition law and mergers and acquisitions regulations) for
stopping abuse.  Only the users of telecommunications services should benefit from
regulatory activity, not the operators who should face the threat of bankruptcy if they do
not perform adequately. 
Martenson (1998) is also critical of the attempts by the regulators to set accounting
rules.  The function of such rules, as pointed out by Harrison and Fisse (1997), is to
prevent cross-subsidisation between different parts of the telecom business. This
practice could enable the incumbent to operate at a loss in parts of the business where
it has competitors.  However, the rules can raise cost and technical accounting barriers
to entry for small entrants attempting to operate between different elements of the
telecom markets. 
[D]efining for example where the – wire-line, cellular, DECT, xDSL,
coaxial, etc.  – ‘access network’ ends and the ‘core network’ starts is
arbitrary, especially as the price tags on the hardware and software
6 As on average every
adult has more that one
(fixed or mobile)
telephone. 
may be set in any manner that makes sense for the equipment
supplier... Especially newcomers and small companies should be free
to keep their book-keeping simple (Martenson, 1998: 730). 
The subdivision of technology, he believes, should be left to the individual firm, not
dictated from ‘on high’. 
The guarantee of a particular level of service - a universal service - can only be
achieved, according to Chang (1997) through regulatory intervention.  Deregulation has
up- and downsides. Chang (1997) mentions that those who may inevitably lose out in
deregulation are the disadvantaged, customers who were subsidised under the old
regime but are now often denied access to the service, or charged higher prices.  He
further remarks that such losses may be outweighed by the overall gains to the
customer base as a whole – the ‘compensation principle’. However, as the right to a
universal service is guaranteed by the new regulation, even under a regime of ‘pure’
competition, all consumers must receive a specific minimal service.  
According to Martenson (1998) the universal service provision actually prevents the
development of a competitive market in telecoms in the sense that it is likely to enhance
the position of the incumbent firm:
I have never heard of an incumbent who of his own free will hands
over the customers to the competitors, who claim they are able to
fulfil this universal service obligation more cheaply.  In fact, network
externalities are likely to be such that it makes sense for the
incumbent to continue investing in order to offer the already
connected subscribers more opportunities to call (Martenson 1998:
736). 
Even in more ‘essential services’ such as running water or public transport, there is
no mandate to provide a certain level of service, and ‘the discussion about universal
service obligation is conspicuous by its absence’ (Martenson, 1998: 736). 
In relation to the question as to whether telecom-specific regulation is necessary,
Spiller and Cardilli (1997) comment that general competition law was found to be
wanting when applied to problems specific to the telecom sector.  They studied the
attempts in New Zealand, Australia, Chile and Guatemala to move their telecom sectors
towards full competition. These countries were chosen as they were among the first to
liberalise their telecom sectors. There were also many similarities among them. For
example, the incumbent providers were all state-controlled monopolies. Also, there was
a political will to deregulate the market and push through radical reforms.  
Chile and New Zealand proceeded using only general competition law; the problems
they encountered led to Australia and Guatemala establishing dedicated telecom
regulation. Thus ‘the countries have learned from each other in the process’ (Spiller and
Cardilli, 1997: 127).  What emerges is that there are three factors that result in the need
for telecom-specific regulation, namely interconnection, equal access and unbundling.
They are also the ‘key building blocks that determine how quickly… competition will
emerge once the telecommunications sector is demonopolized’ (Spiller and Cardilli,
1997: 127-8).  
To illustrate, interconnection costs for a new entrant can constitute half of total
costs. It is typical in telecom markets that the incumbent is a former monopoly PTO
with control over the network.  In the absence of an ex ante interconnection mandate
the telecom incumbent will be in a position to exert market power to a greater degree
than most other former monopoly incumbents in market sectors outside of
telecommunications (Harrison and Fisse, 1997: 3).  Equal access and unbundling were
also found to require sector specific (ex ante) regulation to avoid similar possible
monopoly plays on the part of the former PTO incumbent (Spiller and Cardilli 1997:
129).
Interconnection, equal access and unbundling have also been identified by the OECD
(1995), ETNO7 (1995) and the European Commission (1997)8 as crucial to the
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector. The focus on these elements has also
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been transposed into Irish law by the adoption of the following statutory instruments:
European Communities, (Telecommunications Infrastructure) Regulations 19979
European Communities, (Leased Lines) Regulations 199810
European Communities (Interconnection in Telecommunications) Regulations,
199811, and
European Communities (Full Competition in Telecommunications) Regulations
199812.
How competitive has the ISP market become following the combination of
deregulation and regulation that has been experienced in Ireland?  One way of
examining this is via pricing.  All ISPs who use Eircom’s network as a carrier for their
Internet services are charged at the exact same rate13. The variance in costs comes only
with regard to what level of usage an ISP requires of Eircom’s network, but the rate is
constant. Therefore all players are faced with the same price for access to the network.
With regard to the end user prices for these services, the Regulator has left it to the
discretion of the individual players. There are three possible mechanisms for the pricing
of Internet access, flat rate access, subscription based access and free access. Those
operators who supply ISP services via wireline in Ireland operate various combinations
of these pricing mechanisms.
Competition, Pricing and Concentration
Three separate service bundles are available for Internet access. Below is a
comparative table for Internet access with subscription fees included. The table is based
on Nielsen NetRatings December 2000 Irish Internet usage report, which states that on
average Irish Internet users spend four hours per month on-line. The figures for IOL
Free and Ocean and Indigo are calculated for Eircom and Esat local call rates14.
TABLE 1: 
COMPARATIVE PRICING TABLES FOR 
AVERAGE 4 HOURS INTERNET ACCESS. 
PRICES ARE SHOWN IN IRISH POUNDS.
Analysing the above table, we can see that the costs of ‘free’ Internet access for the
end user are identical across the board. There is a small difference in costs of
subscription-based Internet access.
As IOL No Limits is the only available flat rate service, relative pricing is not
immediately obvious.  Such comparison is possible, however, if all other Internet access
offers are calculated on the basis of the IOL No Limits Internet access offer of £20 per
month for unlimited off-peak access15.  The access time on-line for each Internet access
bundle is revealed at this price16.
13 See Eircom Reference
Interconnect Offer (RIO)
Version 1.4
9 S.I. No. 338/1997
10 S.I. No. 15/1998
11 S.I. No. 109.1998
12 S.I. No. 180/1998
ISP SERVICE PEAK TIME OFF-PEAK TIME
Eircom Esat Eircom Esat
FREE ACCESS IOL FREE 9.60 9.60 2.40 2.40
INDIGO 9.60         9.60 2.40          2.40
OCEAN 9.60 9.60 2.40 2.40
SUBSCRIPTION IOL GOLD 15.68 13.84
EIRCOM.NET 16.26 14.34
FLAT RATE IOL NO LIMITS 27.20 20.00
14 The Esat Local call
rates have three bands,
daytime 3p per minute,
evening 2p per minute
and weekends 1p per
minute. However, the Esat
rates used for pricing
Internet access have two
bands as applied to IOL
Free, 4p per minute peak
and 1p per minute
off–peak respectively.
15 Peak rate access is
zero at the subscription
rate.
16 With regard to IOL
Gold and Eircom.net, the
on-line access times for
£20 are calculated by
subtracting the
subscription costs and
then calculating the on-
line time for the
remainder.
TABLE 2: 
ON-LINE ACCESS TIME AT £20 PER MONTH. 
ACCESS TIMES ARE SHOWN IN HOURS.
What the data indicate is that in order for flat rate access to be a viable alternative
for consumers, they would need to be on-line at least 15.79 hours per month, the ‘least
amount of peak time on-line’ alternative for £20 per month. Indeed, consumers could
obtain up to 33.33 hours per month at this price if they subscribed to the free access
option. However, there are potentially 210 hours of free (off-peak) access per month17 (7
hours per day), which, if accessed with a free subscription service (off-peak call charges
only) would cost £126 per month. Flat rate access is thus positioned to attract extremely
heavy users of the Internet, those who are going to be on-line considerably longer than
the four-hour average of Nielsen. 
It is reported18 that Internet users are ‘likely to float between the subscription based
ISPs and the free ISPs19. This suggests that consumers see these products/services as
being substitutable. However there are only two telephony Internet suppliers, Eircom
and Esat. The fact that their access prices for both free and subscription based access
are similar could be interpreted as behaviour indicative of collusive oligopoly.  Is there
other evidence for or against price collusion?
Among the functions of Regulator is to encourage as much competition as possible in
telecommunications markets. There are currently 77 licensed telecommunication
operators in the state, of which 11 operators hold a fifteen-year general
telecommunications licence. These operators are engaged for example in the provision of
wireless telecommunications access and the provision of international
telecommunications links, but there is nothing to stop them entering the ISP market at
any time. This suggests that the requirement for a telecommunications licence is not
acting as a barrier to entry20.  
The potential for any of a number of companies to become competitors to Eircom and
Esat in the ISP market can be taken as a degree of contestability that militates against
collusive pricing.  It is in fact entirely possible that the similarity in Internet access
prices is indicative of strong competition; in the theoretical ‘perfect’ competition model
free entry prevents any incumbent from extracting economic rents, so prices are as low
as they can go and economic profits must be zero.  This suggests that there is no
agreement to keep ISP prices in Ireland artificially high.
On the other hand, could the prices for Internet access be too low? There is no
predatory pricing (temporarily pricing below cost in order to wipe out opposition) in the
market for household Internet service, as all Internet access offers, including ‘free
access’, must cover the cost of the utilisation of the telephony network.  The information
on pricing thus suggests that while at first sight there may be grounds to believe that
there is collusive price-setting, there is also evidence of a degree of contestability; this
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ISP SERVICE OFF-PEAK TIME
Eircom Esat
FREE ACCESS IOL FREE 33.33 33.33
INDIGO 33.33 33.33
OCEAN 33.33 33.33
SUBSCRIPTION IOL GOLD 17.39 
EIRCOM.NET 15.79
FLAT RATE IOL NO LIMITS Unlimited
17 Based on Hackwatch
figures, 17th February
1999
18 Hackwatch, 11th
August, 1999
19 Hackwatch, 11th
August, 1999
20 There may, of course,
be other barriers to entry.
Economists use the term
‘contestability’ to describe
the ease with which
potential entrants can
become competitors to
incumbent firms.
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results in more competitive pricing than would be the case for an incumbent duopoly
with barriers to entry.
A Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) measure (Jacobson and Andréosso-
O’Callaghan, 1996: 54) using fixed line telecommunications market shares shows that
while the fixed line telecommunications market, inclusive of Internet service provision, is
still highly concentrated, concentration has declined significantly, from 0.88 to 0.70 over
a period of just one year.  (The closer the index is to 1, the greater the extent to which
the market is dominated by a single firm.)  The reciprocal of the HHI (i.e. 1/HHI)
provides a ‘numbers equivalent’ (Lipczynski and Wilson, 2001: 110).  These numbers are
interpreted as the number of equal sized firms that would generate that HHI.  Thus in
March 2000 there were the equivalent of 1.14 equal sized firms and this had grown to
1.43 in March 2001.  This is evidence of increasing competition in telecommunications,
though does not really say anything specifically about the ISP market.  Information on
this market - though available to the ODTR - is not public.
TABLE 3: 
HHI CALCULATION FOR FIXED LINE MARKET SHARE
Source: ODTR Irish Telecom Market Quarterly Reviews March 2000-200121
The regulatory approach to telecommunications in Ireland and indeed across the
OECD has to date had one overriding purpose, to open the telecommunications
networks of PTOs such as Eircom to full competition. This has been attempted by
allowing open access to incumbent’s voice telephony networks. The ODTR has created a
market for service provision by forcing Eircom to allow access to its telephony network
on equal non-discriminatory terms to all OLOs. With regard to network competition the
interest is in the development of the next generation of telecommunications architecture,
namely ‘always-on’ broadband (inclusive of Internet) access, in relation to which there is
a different regulatory policy.
The Future: Broadband Development
Bar et al (2000) and Lessig (2000) in separate examinations of the regulation in
relation to open access in broadband networks in the US, both express concern that the
current policy of open network provision is being abandoned.  Cable operators in
particular are being left with the power to determine which ISP their customers must
use to access the Internet.  This apparent absence of regulation in the development of
broadband networks may have dramatic consequences for residential broadband users. 
21 See www.odtr.ie
Eircom OLOs Eircom OLOs
March 2000 .93 .07 .87 .01 .88 
June 2000 .90 .10 .81 .01 .82
Sept. 2000 .85 .15 .72 .02 .74
Dec. 2000 .83 .17 .69 .03 .72
March 2001 .81 .19 .66 .04 .70
Time when fixed
line market share
was measured
Market Share (Market Share)2 HHI Value
Sum of 
(Market Share)2
Bar et al (2000) distinguish three separate stages in the development of the Internet.
Initially it was designed as a network for the sole purpose of allowing academics to send
information via telephony lines/modems. The military also quickly took an interest,
seeing its ‘security’ potential. This state of affairs lasted for nearly thirty years, from the
late 1960s until the early 1990s. The second generation came with the
commercialisation of the Internet, through the use of narrowband dial-up modems. The
policy of open network provision to the telephony network made it possible for
essentially universal commercial and residential coverage to be achieved, while the
advent of the World Wide Web led to an explosion of commercial and social
experimentation with on-line platforms. 
The third generation is the broadband era, where slow narrowband access is being
replaced with high-speed broadband applications, not just for commercial users, but
also for the residential user. The major distinction between second and third generation
is not just the multi-platform ability of broadband but also that it is a continuous
stream, unlike the spasmodic nature of narrowband access.
The advent of residential broadband, ‘always-on’ access, is being made possible by
the upgrade of local residential infrastructure, either in the form of high-speed modem
or DSL telephony access, or by the upgrade of cable television networks. However,
according to Bar et al (2000), policy in the US with regard to third generation
development is in direct opposition to that advocated for first and especially second
generation development. A policy of open network access, where OLOs could gain access
to network elements ‘on cost-effective terms’ was seen to drive both competition and
innovation for second generation platforms. However, broadband development is
different:
The cable industry, that clearly dominates the early deployment of
the Internet’s third generation access infrastructure for the
residential market, comes from a different policy tradition, where the
cable owners control access to their networks. As cable moves from
‘broadcast’ to ‘broadband’, policy-makers are thus faced with an
important choice: should the open access requirements developed for
previous-generation be extended to the new broadband access
infrastructures, or will competition among distinct third-generation
access networks serve as a substitute for open access and continue
to sustain wide-ranging innovation? (Bar et al, 2000: 490).
The fear of network foreclosure for third generation network development can be
seen, according to the authors, by looking at the merger between AT&T and TCI which,
at the time, was the largest cable operator in the US. By merging with TCI, AT&T gained
control of Excite@Home, the number one provider of broadband cable access in the US.
AT&T is arguing that it should be allowed to determine which ISPs have access over
Excite@Home’s network, ‘…just as cable operators have always controlled which video
programs are sent over their network’ (Bar et al, 2000: 490). Regulatory intervention
would, according to AT&T, decrease the incentive of the network provider to upgrade its
network. The counterpoint to this argument is being put forward by local telephony
operators, seeking the retention of the same telephony network open access provision
for broadband cable networks. 
There is an argument that market forces, in particular direct network externalities,
will eventually lead to cable operators opening their architecture. However, it is cable
operators’ ability to shape indirect externalities - the content - that is of immediate
concern. This ability allows the cable operators to act as Microsoft have in the past,
‘using its control of the operating system’s architecture to favour some applications over
others, with similar anti-competitive implications’ (Bar, et al, 2000). 
Irish Broadband Markets22
The major wired cable operator in Ireland, NTL, has been granted an exclusivity
contract for the supply of cable television services in its service areas, the most
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important of which is the Dublin metropolitan area. However, it has failed to honour the
terms of its agreement with the ODTR, to have digital television and associated
broadband services (Internet, telephony) up and running at this stage. This is due in no
small part to NTL’s under-estimation of the costs of broadband upgrades to the cable
network it inherited when purchasing Cablelink, the costs being double (over IR£400m)
the original estimate.
In relation to broadband roll-out in Ireland overall, neither of the two main telecom
operators, namely Eircom and Esat, is in a position to offer DSL broadband. This is a
direct consequence of the refusal of the ODTR to allow Eircom to offer digital television
services as part of its broadband development. Eircom subsequently abandoned its DSL
roll-out as it would not prove cost effective without the ability to offer bundled
broadband services. As Esat is still reliant on Eircom for service carriage, any DSL
development on their own would be of little use if Eircom’s network was not also
upgraded; any telecommunications network is only as fast as its slowest link. 
It follows that there is currently no wired residential broadband Internet or other
telecom service available in the state. There is a sharp contrast between the high
standard of international telecom connections (Global Crossing and 360newtorks) and
the relatively backward domestic situation.  In many parts of Europe and North America
‘always-on’ residential access is already available. The regulatory approach of the
government, which encouraged telephony based telecom competition, is hindering
broadband development. ‘This is particularly odd for a Government that has
demonstrated its understanding of the value of creatively motivating business to do
what you’d like done’ (Lillington 2001a). The crux of the problem with regard to the roll-
out of broadband is that outside of the major urban areas there is a distinct lack of
development. This situation is made worse by the fact that ‘…no overarching planning
authority exists to oversee infrastructure developments’ (Lillington, 2001a).
Even with regard to second generation technology, Irish residential Internet access is
still below the European average, coming in at between 17 to 22 per cent of households
(Smyth 2001c). There is also a ‘digital divide’ between Dublin and the rest of the
country. The current economic climate, spurred by a cash crisis among the major
telecom operators who may have over stretched, is also affecting the roll-out of
broadband. NTL is now to offer its digital television service over its existing network
instead of upgrading it to broadband. This means that it will not be in a position to offer
interactive services or more crucially ‘always-on’ broadband Internet services. ‘This is a
major disappointment, given that Dublin has the highest cable television penetration
rate in Europe at 83 per cent and it was thought NTL would bring much needed
competition to the Republic’s market’ (Smyth, 2001c). 
In contrast to our argument about the market for provision of internet access, there
is a distinct lack of domestic competition for bandwidth that is keeping prices at
‘prohibitive’ levels.  ‘In some cities, such as Cork, the existing network cannot handle
additional demands. Other regions, such as most of Mayo and Donegal, lack fibre and,
thus, are not in the running…’ (Lillington, 2001b). For example, with regard to OLO
local access, the other players initially targeted 28 exchanges for unbundled access, but
the delay and costs of access mean that only Esat is now showing any interest in
unbundling. Both the Regulator and Eircom are backing into a corner on the local loop
issue, the former threatening to impose a mandatory interconnect price, the latter
threatening legal action to ensure a recoup of network investment costs. 
Six licenses to operate wireless loops have been issued by the Regulator. The only
firm to actually introduce a local service, Formus, collapsed in April of this year.
Chorus, the wireless cable specialist has introduced wireless ‘always-on’ Internet.
‘However, it is understood that such services are available to a limited number of
customers. The telecommunications regulator has also expressed concerns about
Chorus’s offerings, saying she received 300 complaints last year’ (Smyth, 2001c). No real
alternative to wired local access exists, even though both Esat and Eircom have wireless
local loop licences. 
The EU/Irish government approach to telecommunications competition has been to
use threats rather than incentives. The ODTR has given Eircom one month to put
forward terms for access to the local loop. The Regulator ‘…felt that there had been
unnecessary delays in the unbundling process and expressed dismay that ‘relatively
straightforward’ issues had needed regulatory intervention’ (Smyth, 2001a).  A final
report on the issue of unbundling is due shortly. Access to the local loop is to be
achieved through bitstream access. NTL will offer a limited digital television service,
though less than under the terms of its licence. Finally, the National Development Plan’s
aims for broadband have also become unhinged as key players such as Eircom back out
of their plans:
Privately, many State officials express concerns that broadband
development internally has lumbered to a standstill. Unless the
snags are sorted out, the situation could begin to affect the
perception of the Republic as an attractive location for companies,
especially the high-value technology companies focused on research
and development (Lillington, 2001b).
Conclusion
There was an apparent regulatory dichotomy: the breaking up of one former
monopoly, Eircom, while granting certain OLOs exclusive rights over certain service
bundles allowing them to act as de facto monopolies in specified local markets. This
situation was compounded by the fact that the principal holder of exclusive rights,
namely NTL, did not deliver the services it was legally bound to deliver. The ODTR could
possibly have solved this problem by allowing the former PTO deliver these services. Its
failure to allow this resulted in Eircom completely abandoning its broadband upgrade.
This directly affected those OLOs who relied on Eircom for service carriage. As there was
no national alternative broadband architecture, ISPs were still locked into the delivery of
spasmodic residential Internet access, which continued to hinder access from the home.
In this paper we have discussed the changes in the regulatory environment
necessitated in part by changing technology and in part by political processes.  We have
shown how the telecommunications market in particular has behaved.  As in other
countries, the Irish PTO, Eircom, was forced to accept increasing competition.  In
relation to narrowband access to the Internet, there is an increasing level of competition.
We have also shown, however, that in relation to the development of broadband, ‘always
on’ access to the Internet, the Regulator in Ireland seemed to have stumbled.  Among
the fundamental issues for future research are whether the European model of
regulation is appropriate in a market for Internet access as small as Ireland’s; what the
alternatives are to local cable monopolies; the extent to which natural monopolies exist
in Irish networks, both at the local and national levels; and how open access - as with
narrowband - can continue to be provided through cable operators. 
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